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The Great God Pan
is Not Dead
A. N. Whitehead and the 
Psychedelic Mode of Perception
– Peter Sjöstedt-H –
Wherefore the current of my soul hath broken
The bounds of sensual life, 
And I am grown a god, a sinewy token
Of Pan’s most ardent strife;
I am his own; I seem 
The shadow of his dream,
As he is spinning thoughts of form and sense
Out of the formless void, stark, cold and dense.1
                                        
 – Victor B. Neuburg
Preamble
Through Alfred North Whitehead’s metaphysics, the Philosophy of Organism, it will be argued that psychedelic experience is a vertical, 




a. Superordinate—upward—partial apotheosis 
(panentheist postulate)
b. Subordinate—downward—partial enmerosis 
(panexperientialist postulate)II. Lateral Integration—sideward:– Enhancement of Perception in the Mode of       
Causal Efficacy– Antithesis of SolipsismIII. Temporal Integration—backward– Mnemonic Enhancement
I. a. 
Partial Apotheosis
Apotheosis, elevation to divinity, is preconditioned by the being of that deific 
entity. Whitehead’s god is both immanent and transcendent, in the traditional 
senses—but Whitehead’s god is not the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
The god’s being is not based on faith but, in part, on the logical necessity of 
Eternal Objects which constitute His transcendent nature. 
Eternal Objects are Whitehead’s variant of Plato’s Forms, of Russell’s 
Universals, and of Santayana’s Essences. They are every potential form of 
mentality: ideas (numbers, classes, etc.), emotions (fear, joy, etc.), sensations 
(colours, tastes, etc.), and other human and inhuman forms. One must be 
careful to distinguish these potential forms of mentality from actual forms of 
mentality.  The latter exist in time as the subjective phases of an organism, for 
instance as the thoughts we harbour during the day. The former, the Eternal 
Objects, can exist in time when they so ingress into actuality; but they mostly 
subsist out of time—eternally—in their unprehended totality.
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Viewed thus the objects of our mentality are eternal, though our mentality 
is temporal. As the reality of such metaphysical objects may seem dubious 
to many, let us take an example to demonstrate the reasoning. Consider the 
sensation whiteness as an Eternal Object, or as a Universal as Whitehead’s 
student, collaborator and friend Bertrand Russell calls such objects. Russell 
writes:
In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, 
but the act of thinking of whiteness. … [If] whiteness were 
the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men 
could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. … 
Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they 
are the objects of thoughts. … [Universals] subsist or have 
being, where “being” is opposed to “existence” as being 
timeless [eternal].2
More succinctly yet poetically, Whitehead claims the same point:
The mountain endures. But when after ages it has worn 
away, it has gone. If a replica arises, it is yet a new 
mountain. A colour is eternal. It haunts time like a spirit. 
It comes and it goes. But where it comes, it is the same 
colour. It neither survives nor does it live.3
Thus whiteness, colours, and all other objects of mentality are deemed 
metaphysical. Let us delve into the physical to examine the point. A man is 
seeing a patch of white. Where is this whiteness? 
(1) We cannot say it is in the physical object as such, say a cloud. Here there 
exist the molecules constituting the cloud, which themselves are not white 
(akin to Berkeley’s emphasis4).
 
(2) Further we cannot say that whiteness is in the certain reflected 
electromagnetic wave as 
(a) the wave without a perceiver will not be white, 
(b) the same wave can be perceived as different colours (inverted 
spectrum, synaesthesia), and
(c) the same perceived colour can have different waves (metamerism).
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(3) The whiteness is not actually in the anatomy of the percipient nor in its 
functioning. It is not in the eyes, nerves, brain: within the skull pervades 
darkness. The brain does not turn white when intuiting whiteness, as it does 
not turn triangular when intuiting a triangle.
(4) Though the object that is whiteness is correlated with activity in the 
brain, with the electromagnetic light wave, and with the cloud, this correlate 
is not thereby determined as identical to any of these. Whiteness is neither 
an emergent property of the brain, as such a notion commits the Emergence 
Category Mistake,5 erroneously presupposing brute emergence and an 
analogy between nature’s otherwise physical-to-physical acts of emergence 
(e.g. liquidity from molecules) and a purported physical-to-mental emergence. 
Emergence is the magic with which materialism is spellbound.
(5) Whiteness is thus not identical (1—–3) to its various correlates, it is not 
an emergent property (4) of those subvenient correlates, but nor is it simply 
the abstracted common feature of white objects as this would entail that 
those objects had the whiteness from which one could abstract it as such. As 
Santayana puts it, 
Having never been parts of any perceived object, it is 
impossible that given essences should be abstracted from it.6
Thus, the object of a thought, feeling, sensation is, as Russell 
concludes, ‘neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it 
is something.’7 Eternal Objects are real, transcendent, and the condition of 
shared experiences—thus they are a condition of language, a condition of 
knowledge, and for Whitehead a condition for the creative advance of the 
universe. As Russell put it in Mysticism and Logic:
A truer image of the world … is obtained by picturing 
things as entering into the stream of time from an eternal 
world outside … . Both in thought and in feeling, even 
though time be real, to realise the unimportance of time is 
the gate of wisdom.8
The realm in which all Eternal Objects subsist is named by Whitehead 
the Primordial Nature of God. This is the transcendent aspect of Whitehead’s 
deity, an insentient dimension as sentience requires the ingression of the 
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Eternal Objects into physical temporal actuality to be objects of prehension. As 
physical organisms, the incessant selection of Eternal Objects is conditioned 
by our physical needs, and thus only a fraction are positively prehended, the 
rest rejected through negative prehensions, to use Whitehead’s terminology. 
It is my contention that these negative prehensions can be eliminated in 
degree by the impairment of practical physiological functioning via the 
intake of psychedelic chemicals. Such elimination entails the integration, 
nay elevation, of one’s consciousness into the primordial nature of this god: 
apotheosis. This is a mysticism without mystical groundings. As Russell 
foresaw:
We may hope, in a mystic illumination, to see the [eternal] 
ideas as we see objects of sense; and we may imagine that 
the ideas exist in heaven. These mystical developments are 
very natural, but the basis of the theory is in logic, and it is 
as based in logic that we have to consider it.9
George Santayana considered the same spectacle, in horror:
If I aspired to be a disembodied spirit, I ought to envisage all 
essences equally and at once—a monstrous requirement.10 
Such upward integration into the primordial nature of the deity verily 
may not be joyful, it may evoke intense empyreal dread of the kind Rudoph 
Otto calls the mysterium tremendum, aspects of which include ‘“daemonic 
dread” (cf. the horror of Pan)’,11 culminating in the literal awfulness that is 
the original sense of the idea of the holy. As certain Eternal Objects have 
a being which would usually be ingressed in epochs existing beyond our 
spatio-temporal, electromagnetic epoch (as Whitehead has it), the alienness 
of such objects could further the sense of a dread-inducing sublime. Such 
experiences cannot therefore be categorized as recreation but rather as ‘the 
inmost aim and highest achievement of cognition’,12 as Santayana calls 
entrance into this realm of Essence ab aeterno.
— — —
The other aspect of Whitehead’s deity is named the Consequent Nature of 
God. This is the immanent and sentient side. God’s function is to initially 
lure entities into self-formation, then to partake in the intense sentient 
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experiences of them, which, as a panexperientialist, as we shall see, includes 
the autopoetic ‘inorganic’—the whole of nature. As Whitehead writes:
God’s purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of 
intensities. The evocation of societies [higher organisms] 
is purely subsidiary to this absolute end.13 
Thus, through psychedelic intake we satisfy the god’s purpose, in a 
league beyond the ordinary mode of mankind. Further still, by allowing 
upward integration into the hitherto unactualised, thus hitherto insentient, 
realm of Eternal Objects, we actualize and activate as sentient aspects of the 
god for the god. Thus through psychedelic ingestion, we increase the self-
consciousness of the god. There is no greater divine activity we can pursue 
than journeying through the psychedelic mindscape—the psychonaut is the 
pilgrim par excellence. Contrariwise, prohibition of psychedelics is the most 
cardinal of sins.
I say ‘the god’. Whitehead came purportedly to regret his use of the word 
‘God’ to designate his deity.14 His metaphysics is in part a panentheism—that 
god is actuality (as the consequent nature of god) and more (the primordial 
nature of god transcending actuality). This is already far removed from the 
theism of the Judeo-Christian lineage, the Abrahamic god. Furthermore, 
as we shall examine, Whitehead’s metaphysics is also a panpsychism, or 
panexperientialism (as his version is now designated15): that all autopoetic 
entities from man to molecule and below have sentience (though not 
necessarily consciousness). Whitehead even writes that the
…function of God is analogous to the remorseless working 
of things in Greek and Buddhist thought … the ruthlessness 
of God can be personified as Até, the goddess of mischief.16
Whitehead further identified his God with Eros, the ‘Universe as one’,17 
and even, when opposing the Semitic god to Plato’s, Satan.18 Thus, with its 
panentheism, panexperientialism, divine mischief and intense hedonism, 
kinship to pagan animism and its Romantic nature worship, we are better 
to re-designate the god of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, as Pan. We 
thereby paganize Whitehead under the symbol of this seducer goat-god, a god 
whose desire for the evocation of intense experiences is instanced in his boast 
of coupling with each of Dionysus’ intoxicated Maenads.19 The lure of Pan 
is better befitted to the philosophy of organism than the canons of Christ; the 
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latter referring to the attempted Christian hijack of Whitehead’s metaphysics 
under the name process theology.
Plutarch relates the story of a sailor who, during the reign of Tiberius 
concurrent to the lifetime of Jesus Christ, receives over the seas an arcane 
vocal declaration to propagate the news that “The great god Pan is dead.”20 
G. K. Chesterton’s pronouncement that ‘It is said truly in a sense that Pan 
died because Christ was born’21 we now invert across a Nietzschean line. The 
decline in Christian belief and its offspring, modern cosmology, allows for a 
revival of a truly naturalistic ontology. God is dead; Pan returns. 
I. b.
Partial Enmerosis
Enmerosis derives from the prefix –en: within, and from méros: part or 
component. The term denotes a downward fusion of sentience into the 
subordinate entities of the human body. 
Before examining the possibility of amplified enmerosis through the 
psychedelic mode of perception, we must examine the condition for its 
possibility: panexperientialism.
Panexperientialism is the notion that every self-organised entity has 
sentience: man, mole, molecule and more. There are overwhelming reasons 
to adopt such a view in the literature,22 a view espoused by such eminent 
thinkers as Bruno, Spinoza, Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Fechner, Nietzsche, 
William James, and later still, scientists such as the Whiteheadian biologist 
C. H. Waddington, who founded the new science of epigenetics. But let us 
appeal to reason rather than to these authorities. 
The so-named ‘Hard Problem of Consciousness’23 signals the old 
problem of understanding how mind can emerge from or be identical to 
‘matter’. Regardless of the complexity of neural activation, why this should 
be correlated to mental activity remains unexplained. This is because it is 
unexplainable in the paradigm that reduces explanation to insentient matter 
moving according to known forces of nature—i.e. to materialism.  Sufficiently 
explaining mind by matter is as successful as sufficiently explaining a squid 
by the correlated ripples in the sea surface above it. Why?
Whitehead’s response to this problem is to state that our idea of ‘matter’ is 
an abstraction rather than a concrete reality. In reality, what we call ‘matter’ 
already includes sentience, feeling. Thus in vain do we attempt to reconstitute 
mind from an abstraction that omits it, just as it would be vain to attempt to 
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reconstitute the taste of calamari by the totality of colours which we have 
abstracted from the creature. An omitted reality cannot be recreated by 
the abstractions that omitted it. This is the cause of the Hard Problem of 
Consciousness, which is not a problem for the panpsychist.
If one concedes that all of nature, in its organized entities, has sentience, 
then mind emerges in degrees of complexity rather than the problematic 
emergence in kind requisite of materialism. The brain is necessary for 
complex human consciousness, but the cells of which it is composed are 
also sentient, as are their components. For Whitehead, the final components 
are named actual entities, or drops of experience. Of these sentient drops all 
actual things are constituted.
The objects of these drops of experience are the Eternal Objects of course, 
but the actualization of these potential eternal forms is the intrinsic sentient 
aspect of all that we call matter. Each actual entity in made concrescent by 
prehending other actual entities which become part of it: the perception 
becomes part of the perceiver. As the actual entities evolve into more complex 
structures, or so-called societies, such as a molecule, the prehended actual 
entities and the Eternal Objects which determined their form combine to create 
more complex forms of mentality accordingly: emotions may be augmented 
by visual qualia, for instance. Feeling, or sentience, is the foundation of all 
perception however. Perception always includes the transferred internalized 
feelings of the entity perceived. This transfer, viewed objectively, from the 
outside, is efficient causality. So perception is causality. The transfer, viewed 
subjectively, from the inside, includes final causality: each actual entity has a 
subjective aim to achieve the satisfaction of a concrescence by uniting former 
actual entities so as to create itself. Thus the determinism we observe is the 
shell of the teleology of nature—a determinism informed by the mistake of 
considering observed past regularities as universal constants. For Whitehead 
the prime tenet that prevails in the universe, above Pan, is creativity. The 
future can never be determined.
In the highly complex type of actuality that is the human, Whitehead 
attributes two main forms of perception, which are in actuality fused. There is 
the classic and commonly accepted Perception in the Mode of Presentational 
Immediacy which is essentially the sensation types from the five senses. David 
Hume said that all our ideas are copies of these impressions. Hume further 
argued that with these sensations we can never perceive causality in itself, 
only the constant conjunction of events. Whitehead, in contradistinction, 
asserts that we humans do perceive causality (as perception is causality). As 
well as this Perception in the Mode of Presentational Immediacy, Whitehead 
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argues that we have Perception in the Mode of Causal Efficacy. This is the 
more primitive form of perception, shared by all organisms—which for him 
meant all entities of nature, as described above—which is a mode broader and 
more vague than the former mode, but nonetheless extant. An entity does not 
need ‘sense organs’ to sense: all action upon something involves an internal 
perception in at least the primitive mode of causal efficacy. Sense organs befit 
larger organisms, bequeathing them with greater means for incorporating 
their environments. An eye grasps light, a leaf also grasps light sans the fine 
distinctions made possible by the eye, a molecule also grasps light but in a 
more primitive sentient causal mode, and reacts accordingly as does the plant 
and animal. Consciousness is an aspect of the more complex organisms, a 
blind sentience is the lot of the micro-world. Yet this blindness is not the 
nothingness of non-panpsychists.
We are never fully conscious of the ceaseless activities of our bodies: the 
maintenance of our livers, the battles fought by our leukocytes, etc. Yet the 
immanences of these bodily cells are vaguely felt by the person, contributing 
to a sense of health, joy, melancholy, or whatnot. The brain, the dominant 
organ of control, channels sentience for the overall benefit of the organism, 
thereby detracting from focus on relatively inessential cellular activity. 
Psychedelic molecules, which trespass through the blood-brain barrier, wreak 
havoc on the brain and let slip anarchy into this otherwise ordered channel. 
As well as the upward integration into alien exogenous Eternal Objects, this 
may also allow downward integration into the endogenous subjectivities of 
the subordinate entities of one’s body: enmerosis. 
As stated, Whitehead already allows for enmerosis via perception in 
the mode of causal efficacy. As this perception is mostly suppressed by our 
higher form of perception (presentational immediacy) via standard brain 
functioning, the physical psychedelic breakdown of that functioning will 
allow the emancipation of those causally efficacious perceptions. Of course, 
the feelings of these subordinate entities will be foreign in their amplification, 
perhaps explaining in part the ineffability William James stakes as criterion 
for the mystical state.24 Naturally the type of psychedelic chemical and the 
dose will greatly affect the level of cerebral breakdown. A small dose will not 





For the external observer the aspects of shape and sense-
objects are dominant … But we must also allow for the 
possibility that we can detect in ourselves direct aspects 
of the mentalities of higher organisms. The claim that 
the cognition of alien mentalities must necessarily be by 
means of indirect inferences from aspects of shape and of 
sense-objects is wholly unwarranted by this philosophy 
of organism. The fundamental principle is that whatever 
merges into actuality, implants its aspects in every 
individual event.25 
– A. N. Whitehead
The Problem of Other Minds refers to the problem of knowing how other 
people and creatures have sentience, as we can only perceive their physical 
behaviour. It is commonly responded to by claiming inference: I know that 
I look and behave in a certain way, and I know that other humans look and 
behave similarly, so I infer that those others also have similar minds.  We can 
infer it to other creatures of similar ilk to us: chimps, dogs, goats—but what 
of insects or plants? We cannot infer it here by analogy, but neither can we 
simply assume those less-resembling organisms are without mind. To stress 
the point, consider Thomas Nagel’s case:
[If] things emerged from a spaceship which we could not 
be sure were machines or conscious beings, what we were 
wondering about [whether they had sentience] would have 
an answer even if the things were so different from anything 
we were familiar with that we could never discover it. 
It would depend on whether there was something it was 
like to be them, not on whether behavioral similarities 
warranted our saying so.26
To respond by claiming we could know whether an entity had sentience 
by whether it had a brain would simply be to postpone the question: how 
do we know that a brain is requisite for sentience? Is this not blatant 
anthropomorphism? Gustav Fechner, the founder of psychophysics, illustrates 
the point with elegance when arguing for the sentience of plants:
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If I remove or destroy all the strings of a piano, a violin, 
a lute, then there will be no tone to the instrument … so 
obviously the strings are the essential means for producing 
tones; they are so to say the nerves of these instruments …
But now when I hear that the flute after all does actually 
produce tones, in spite of my pretty argument, I cannot 
see why plants might not be able to produce subjective 
sensations without having nerves. The animals might be 
the string instruments of sensation, and the plants the wind 
instruments.27
Though such an analysis of the problem of other minds here leads to 
further substantiation of the panexperientialism required for downward 
integration, are we to rest content with such a mere logical, inferential 
response to the problem? Whitehead states in the quotation above that the 
cognition of alien mentalities rests not merely on such indirect inference. The 
belief that this inference is the highest understanding we can acquire rests on 
the assumption that all perception is perception in the mode of presentational 
immediacy. When we augment that capability with perception in the mode of 
causal efficacy, our acknowledged understanding expands. 
The prehension of another entity does not merely stand in the relation 
representation-to-object but rather in the relation part-to-whole. The 
prehension of another is the inclusion of that other as a constituent part of 
oneself. Perception, like ingestion, is assimilation. You are what you eat 
and you are what you perceive. As Whitehead writes, ‘no individual subject 
can have independent reality, since it is a prehension of limited aspects of 
subjects other than itself.’28 
In our standard physiological functioning the welter of perception in the 
mode of causal efficacy is symbolized by the presentational mode. The sun’s 
rays causally hit our eyes and the causal line continues in our nerves, all 
perceived; the Eternal Object of yellow and others ingress for the presentational 
mode, also thus perceived. Hence even the classic understanding of perception 
involves causal efficacy, so feeling is always imbued into all sense qualia, and 
as such the common form of human perception is actually this mixed form 
of Perception in the Mode of Symbolic Reference. Illusions occur when this 
mix is mismatched.
Now, if such standard physiological functioning is impaired through the 
transgression of psychedelic substances, the symbolic mode of reference is 
wrecked. Upward integration can follow, as argued above, especially when 
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one’s environment is scarce of common sense data: in dark, quiet settings. 
Lateral integration can follow in contrary bright open settings where common 
incoming data are abundant. Now, instead of immediately abstracting away 
an object due to humanly practical exigencies, named transmutation—as is 
the evolved remit of the brain and body—that is, instead of referring to the 
object symbolically, the mode of causal efficacy is freed from such symbolic 
bondage. Now the ‘object’ is prehended more physically than conceptually, 
that is more of the object, which has a sentient immanence, enters into 
the constitution of the ‘subject’, thereby further fusing the subject-object 
bifurcation. 
Psychedelic reports do include such lateral integration, the advanced 
form of general vectorisation, as Whitehead calls the infusion of prehended 
objects into the subject. Henri Bergson, a further influence on Whitehead, 
calls such fusion sympathy, the aspect of intuition to which Bergson contrasts 
the conceptual intellect.29 Aldous Huxley made use of Bergson in explaining 
his mescaline experience, and Huxley’s report of becoming one with the 
legs of the table before him is well-known.30 Table legs are aggregates of 
subjectivities as they are not self-organising systems. Of perhaps greater 
interest lies lateral integration of single, more complex subjectivities. Author 
Paul Devereux offers this experience on LSD:
I found my awareness slipping inside that of the daffodil. 
While still being conscious of sitting in a chair, I could also 
sense my petals! Then an exquisite sensation cascaded 
through me, and I knew I was experiencing light falling 
on those petals. It was virtually orgasmic, the haptic 
equivalent of an angelic choir ... A mythic atmosphere 
hung like the most delicate gossamer in the air.31
For the Philosophy of Organism, all perception involves the actual 
integration of the object into the subject, yet this is always limited by the 
subject’s practical considerations, abstract considerations which led to the 
supposed solipsism of subject from object. But a Whiteheadian analysis 
renders solipsism obsolete by highlighting its mistaken assumption: that 
a perception is distinct from the perceived. In the psychedelic mode of 
perception, we thus can move so far from solipsism that we enter the subject 
of the object. 




Hence, in the psychedelic mode of perception we push our identity with Pan 
through our integrated panentheism and panexperientialism. We thereby 
touch the eternal and the present, but what of the past? The past is not actual, 
potential but neither is it nothing. For Whitehead, all actualities pass into 
objective immortality: they are no longer subjectivities but their physical and 
mental forms enter into the composition of actual entities and their nexūs, 
forms of togetherness.
All perception involves perception of the past, memory. But again, those 
aspects commonly selected are those that are conducive to the practicalities 
of the organism. Furthermore, a memory is immortalized as an Eternal Object 
in the empyrean realm that is Pan. Thus these objects are never absolutely 
lost. Analogous to the emancipation from transmutation offered in lateral 
integration, the psychedelic mode of perception can allow for a backward 
integration. This is part of the basis for contemporary studies into the value 
of psychedelic therapy.32 Thus, psychedelic intake enhances access to distant 
memories, access to the objective immortality, emphasizing Whitehead’s 
words that:
What is done in the world is transformed into a reality 
in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the 
world.33
This heaven is often a hell, which is the bane of the sufferer and the object 
of the therapist. Pan is not omnibenevolent. So it is not ‘morally necessary to 
assume the existence of God’, as Kant argued,34 but it is logically necessary 
to assume Eternal Objects which can be named after a less Christian god. 
Through this god backward integration can occur—also to an extent inversely 
related to practicality—as one of the first English commentators on Kant, 
Thomas de Quincey, recounted for an opium-induced experience:
The minutest incidents of childhood, or forgotten scenes 
of later years, were often revived … placed as they were 
before me, in dreams like intuitions, and clothed in all their 
evanescent circumstances and accompanying feelings, 
I recognized them instantaneously. … I feel assured, 
that there is no such thing as forgetting[;] traces once 
impressed upon the memory are indestructible.35
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We have thus vertical, horizontal and backward integration in the 
psychedelic experience. The question concerning forward integration 
remains: actual foresight. In the Philosophy of Organism this is not possible 
as the future is not determined and thus does not exist in its entirety. Creativity 
primes the advance of the universe, with its free teleology of entities—thus the 
future is not yet existent, it is not yet created. Therefore it cannot be foreseen. 
However, in upward integration, Eternal Objects can be experienced which 
would otherwise have their common ingression in future epochs—including 
non-electromagnetic epochs. Thus a slight foresight of potential mentalities 
can be made manifest, though not a foresight of actual events.
Summary
The psychedelic mode of perception allows for a three-dimensional 
integration of experience: the vertical dimension upward to primordial Pan 
and downward into endogenous primitive pieces of perception, understood 
through panexperientialism. The lateral dimension is that along which we 
can integrate sideward into the other exogenous entities constituting our 
environment. The temporal dimension can push us backward to memories 
otherwise lost, and fragmentarily forward in terms of glimpses of future types 
of sentience. These dimensions offer a panopticon of Pan, nature Himself—
experiences of nature otherwise masked by our practical needs. Psychedelic 
perception is the essence of great experience, ultimately the object of 
philosophy itself:
[T]he essence of great experience is penetration into the 
unknown, the unexperienced […] If you like to phrase it 
so, philosophy is mystical. For mysticism is direct insight 
into depths as yet unspoken. But the purpose of philosophy 
is to rationalize mysticism: not by explaining it away, but 
by the introduction of novel verbal characterizations, 
rationally coördinated.36
– A. N. Whitehead
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